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United States v. Elgersma: The Burden of
Proof in Criminal Forfeiture Proceedings
under 21 U.S.C. § 853

I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v.Elgersma, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the issue of what burden of proof applies to a criminal forfeiture
proceeding under section 853 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
19842 ("section 853").1 After examining the legislative history of section
1. 929 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1991).
2. The relevant provisions are as follows:
(a) Property subject to criminal forfeiture: Any person convicted of a violation of
this subchapter or subchapter I of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision
of state law(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained,
directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the-commission of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to
any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims
against, and property or contractual rights affording a source of control over, the
continuing criminal enterprise.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any
other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice
the gross profits or other proceeds.
(d) Rebuttable presumption: There is a rebuttable presumption at trial that any
property of a person convicted of a felony under this subchapter or subchapter II
of this chapter is subject to forfeiture under this section if the United States establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that(1) such property was acquired by such person during the period of the violation
of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter or within a reasonable time
after such period; and
(2) there was no likely source for such property other than the violation of this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter.
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853 and case law- from its own and other circuits, the court held that
criminal forfeiture is a criminal charge requiring the government to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.' A majority of the
court rejected Judge Anderson's concurring opinion in which he argued
that criminal forfeiture is an element of sentencing to be determined by a
preponderance of the evidence standard.5
II.

THE STATUTE:

21 U.S.C. § 853

Congress enacted section 853 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 ("the Act"). Congress' purpose in passing the Act was to
"enhance the use of forfeiture . . . as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking." The Act, particularly section 853, was intended
to "eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that [had] frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture" under the previously enacted criminal
forfeiture provision found in the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute
("CCE").$
Unlike section 848 of the CCE, section 853 authorizes criminal forfeiture in all felony drug cases, regardless of whether a defendant was engaged in a continuous criminal enterprise. In addition to broadening the
(j) Applicability of civil forfeiture provisions: Except to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this section, the provisions of section 881(d) of
this title shall apply to a criminal forfeiture under this section.
(o) Construction: The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
3. 929 F.2d at 1539-40.
4. Id. at 1549.
5. Id. at 1551-52 (Anderson, J., concurring).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-513, title II, § 413, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), as added and amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, §§ 303, 2301(d)-(f), 98 Stat. 2044, 2192, 2193 (1984); Pub. L. No.
99-570, title I, §§ 1153(b), 1864, 100 Stat. 3207-13, 3207-54 (1986).
7. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 853 was not the first criminal forfeiture statute enacted by Congress. The
first federal forfeiture statutes were enacted in 1970 as part of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Statute and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE"). 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(1) of the CCE, the government must prove that the defendant
participated in a managing, supervisory, or organizational capacity of, and received substantial income from, a continuing series of criminal violations involving five persons or more.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
9. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3374, 3381 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 225].
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class of defendants whose property is potentially subject to criminal forfeiture, section 853 allows prosecutors the option of seeking forfeiture in
the same court and before the same jury hearing the criminal case."0
Thus, section 853 provides "a more efficient mechanism for achieving the
forfeiture of a defendant's proceeds from his drug trafficking.""
Section 853(a) does not specify the standard of proof that the jury shall
apply when deciding the ultimate issue of whether a defendant's property
is forfeited."2 However, the rebuttable presumption established by section
853(d) requires that the government need only establish the forfeitability
of a defendant's property by a preponderance of the evidence. The burthe property was not acden then shifts to the defendant to prove that
13
quired as a result of the criminal violation.
Congress' silence on the applicable standard of proof under section
853(a), and its designation of the preponderance of the evidence standard
applicable to the rebuttable presumption created by section 853(d), has
resulted in a disagreement among the circuits over what standard of proof
applies."' The following section discusses decisions by courts holding that
a preponderance of the evidence is the applicable standard of proof in
section 853 criminal forfeiture proceedings.
III. OTHER CIRCUITS: THE CASES PRECEDING Elgersma
A. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals'
In United States v.Sandini,'s defendant was convicted in the district
court of conspiracy and two counts of possession and distribution of cocaine. The government then brought a criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to section 853 before the same jury. After the district court instructed the jury on a preponderance of the evidence standard, the jury
found certain properties of defendant subject to forfeiture."
Defendant argued on appeal that section 853 violates the due process
clause because "it reduces the government's ,burden to a preponderance
10. S. Rep. No. 225 at 210, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3393.
11. Id.
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
14. See United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 900
F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3237 (1990) (holding that burden of proof is
beyond a reasonable doubt); cf. United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512, 1541-42 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2623 (1990); United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d
1560, 1576 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 874-76 (3d Cir. 1987)
(holding that the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence).
15. 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987).
16. Id. at 870-71.
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of the evidence instead of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, however, holding
that, as interpreted by the district court, section 853 did not violate due
process because it was not an element of the underlying criminal offense." Instead, the court characterized section 853 as an element of sentencing, and as such, the section required only proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.19 In support of its reasoning, the court stated that an
examination of the legislative history of section 853 "makes clear that
Congress sought to make the government's burden of proof in criminal
0
forfeitures the same as that in the civil realm."'1
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
s1 defendant
In United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega,
was charged
with conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute, conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce in
aid of a racketeering enterprise, and engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise. The district court instructed the jury to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in its consideration of the forfeiture issue. After convicting defendant on the drug violation charges, the
jury then found certain property of defendant's subject to forfeiture pursuant to section 853."
On appeal, defendant argued that the district court's instruction was
erroneous on the issue of burden of proof. Defendant argued that the government's burden of proof under section 853(a) remained beyond a reasonable doubt, even if the presumption created by 853(d) required only a
preponderance standard." The court rejected defendant's argument, stating that the 853(d) presumption "would have no significance whatsoever

17. Id. at 874.
18. Id. at 875.
19. Id. "'[the court, in imposing sentence . . . shall order, in addition to any other
sentence . . . that the person forfeit . . . all property described in this subsection.'" Id.

(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988)). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
To support its conclusion that, as an element of sentencing, § 853 required the civil standard of proof, the court stated that "statutes permitting enhanced penalties have established the prosecution's burden of proof as a preponderance of the evidence." 816 F.2d at
875. See also United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir. 1985).
20. 816 F.2d at 876. Commentators and other courts have criticized the court's declaration that the legislative history is clear on this issue. See Barry Tarlow, Forfeiture Trends,
THE CHAMPION: NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 42; Elgersma, 929 F.2d 1538,
1546.
21. 886 F.2d 1560 (9th Cir. 1989).
22. Id. at 1562-76.
23. Id. at 1576. Defendant first argued unsuccessfully that the § 853(d) presumption was
unconstitutional. Id. at 1576-77
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if the prosecution were still required to prove the forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt.124 Agreeing with the Third Circuit's characterization of
section 853 as a sentencing statute, the court then held that the proper
standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.25
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

C.

In United States v. Herrero," defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, interstate
travel to promote drug trafficking, and possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. The government then sought to establish that certain real
estate owned by defendant was subject to forfeiture under 853(d). The
district court found the government had established by a preponderance
that defendant's interest in the property was forfeitable, and that defendant's testimony regarding the acquisition of the property was unbelievable. Therefore, the court ordered defendant's interest in the property
forfeited.2 '
Defendant argued on appeal that section 853 "improperly requires a
lesser quantum of evidence than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and,
thus, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the criminal defendant.' 8 Rejecting defendant's argument, the court noted that the issue
was one of first impression in the Seventh Circuit, but stated that it
agreed with the Third Circuit's holding in Sandini.29 The court then held
that the proper standard of proof under section 853 was a preponderance
of the evidence.30
IV. THE CASE
In United States v. Elgersma,31 a majority of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the proper standard of proof in a criminal
forfeiture action under section 853 is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The majority, while holding that the district court's jury instruction was
erroneous as to the applicable standard of proof, affirmed the district
court's judgment of forfeiture because the erroneous jury instruction did

24.
25.
26.
,27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1577 (citing Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Id.
893 F.2d 1512 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1541-44. See United States v. Haro, 685 F. Supp. 1468, 1472 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
893 F.2d at 1541.
Id. at 1541-42.
Id. at 1541.
929 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1548.
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not constitute plain error. 33 In a concurring opinion, Judge Anderson argued that the proper standard of proof in a section 853 forfeiture action is
the preponderance of the evidence standard.8
Appellant, Edwin Elgersma, along with several codefendants, was
charged with shipping cocaine into the United States, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, and criminal forfeiture.8 ' In the criminal forfeiture count, the government sought to take Elgersma's land and residence in Marathon, Florida; land in Monroe County, Florida and Lincoln
County, Montana; a cashier's check for $73,200; and United States currency and coins.36
After the government amended its indictment to correct citations, a
jury trial was held in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida. Elgersma moved to dismiss the continuing criminal
enterprise count on grounds that the indictment failed to aver the essential elements of the offense. The district court denied the motion, and the
jury found Elgersma guilty on
thirteen counts of drug trafficking and con7
tinuing criminal enterprise.3
On the day Elgersma was convicted of the drug trafficking and continuing criminal enterprise counts, a forfeiture proceeding was held before the
same jury. The district court instructed the jury that it should consider
all of the evidence and the testimony presented in Elgersma's preceding
criminal trial when considering the matter of forfeiture.8 Counsel for
both parties argued to the jury the issue of "whether the evidence in the
preceding criminal trial met the forfeiture requirements of sections 853(a)
and (d), but did not introduce any new evidence."'"
The district court then instructed the jury that if the government could
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Elgersma acquired the
property in question during or near the time of the drug trafficking, and
that, but for the violations, Elgersma had no likely source for the property, a rebuttable presumption would arise that the property was subject
to criminal forfeiture. 0 The district judge explained the preponderance of
33. Id. at 1551.
34. Id. (Anderson, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 1540. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988) states that a person is engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise if he commits a felony that is a part of a series of violations of the Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which is undertaken by such person "in concert with
five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and (B) from which such
person obtains substantial income or resources." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
36. 929 F.2d at 1542 n.10.
37. Id. at 1540-42.
38. Id. at 1542-50.
39. Id. at 1550.
40. Id. at 1542. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

19921]

CRIMINAL FORFEITURE

1335

the evidence standard to the jury, and then instructed the jury to return
guilty verdicts ,on' a special verdict form if it found that the government
had met its burden and that Elgersma failed to rebut the presumption
with contrary evidence."' The district court did not instruct the jury on
to the ultimate forfeiture of Elgersma"s
the standard of proof applicable
2
property under section 853(a).

Elgersma's attorney failed to object when the district court requested
objections to the jury instruction." After, deliberating for three and onehalf hours, the jury returned a special verdict forfeiting four of the six
items in question."

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "[district] court should have instructed the jhry that the elements of forfeiture
under section 853(a) had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'4 The
court affirmed the deisioh of the district court, however, holding that the
omission by the district court judge in his jury instructions was not plain
error .' The court reasoned that, the "jury was instructed to carry over
evidence from the preceding trial, and it is likely that it also carried over
the standard of proof by which -to measure the evidence. '"' In support of
its reasoning that.the district court's omission in its jury instruction did
noted that the jury had not elected to
not constitute plain errbor, the. court
8
forfeit all of Elgersnia's property.'
A.

The Majority Opinion.

Judge Kravitch, writing for the majority, framed the exact issue to be
decided as '"the burden of proof applicable at a post-conviction forfeiture
proceeding of a criminal defendant under section 853. ' "" Kravitch stated
41. 929 F.2d'at 1542. FED. R. CiM. P.31(e) requires that "[If an] interest or property is
subject to criminal ,forfeiture,, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the
interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any.",
42. 929 F.2d at 1550. 21 U.S.C. § .853(a) (1988) is silent on the issue of the government's
burden of proof in a criminal forfeiture proceeding.
43. 929 F.2d at 1542. Elgersma's lawyer mistakenly believed that the forfeiture proceeding was a civil rather than criminal proceeding. After being corrected by the court, and after
the jury had retired to deliberate, Elgersma's lawyer did state that "criminal proceedings
'have always required that the standard of evidence be beyond and to the exclusion of every
reasonable doubt.'" Id. 'at'1542 n.13.
44. Id. at 1550. "Thb items not forfeited were the land in Monroe County and the U.S.
currency and coins." Id. at 1550 6.27.
45. Id. at 1550.
46. Id. at 1551. On apleal, both parties agreed that plain error was the proper standard
of review, due to counsel for Elgersma failing to object to the district -court's jury instruction. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1543-44.
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that since section 853 did not state the burden of proof required, the
court's task was one of statutory construction."
The court noted that the United States Supreme Court "ha[d] examined section 853 in two related cases addressing the sixth amendment,
but neither addressed the question of the proper burden of proof."5 1
Looking to cases decided in the Eleventh Circuit, the court found that
"[tiwo appellate decisions merely mention the application of the reasonable doubt standard to section 853 proceedings. 5 2 The court did, however,
refer to a district court decision that discussed the section 853(d) standard of preponderance for the rebuttable presumption, "but did not mention any further instruction on beyond a reasonable doubt." 5 Thus, the
court found that the cases decided in the Eleventh Circuit since the enactment of section 853 were not determinative of the issue before it."
Noting that "[pirior to the enactment of section 853, criminal forfeiture
was relatively rare,"s the court found only one case from that period on
point.16 The Eleventh Circuit noted that in United States v.Garrett5 '
appellants were convicted of federal narcotics violations and continuing
criminal enterprise pursuant to section 848, the predecessor to section
853. 58 The court in Garrett rejected the governmeni's "'distinction between the trial on the issue of guilt and subsequent determinations, and
the government's characterization of the forfeiture as "essentially a matter of punishment" indistinguishable from ordinary sentencing.' ""
The majority opinion in Elgersma then examined the legislative history
of section 853.0 The court; disagreeing with the Third Circuit's declaration that the legislative history clearly indicated Congress' desire for application of the civil standard of proof to section 853, stated that "[a]
review of the legislative history only dimly indicates what the burden of
proof should be.""
50. Id. at 1543.
51. Id. at 1544. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
52. See United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990) (plea agreement pursuant to criminal and civil forfeiture) and United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544,
546 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1322 (1990).
53. 929 F.2d at 1544 (citing United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986)).
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. 727 F.2d 1003 (lth Cir. 1984), affd, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
58.
59.

929 F.2d at 1544.,
Id. (quoting United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d at 1012 n.6).

60. 929 F.2d at 1544-46.
61.

Id. at 1544.
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The court noted that the Senate report "twice stated that although the
bill was intended to ease the use of criminal forfeiture by utilizing evidence presented at trial, civil forfeiture retained some advantages over
criminal forfeiture, such as a lower burden of proof." s The court also
referred to the Senate report's discussion of the right of third parties to
challenge findings of forfeiture in an ancillary proceeding, which eventually became section 853(n).6 3 In that discussion, the Senate report stated:
"'Since the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof
at the hearing will be on the third party.'-64 The court acknowledged
that "[i]t is unclear from these references whether the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal trial also should be applied in
the criminal forfeiture proceeding following trial." 5
The court then addressed the rebuttable presumption set forth in section 853(d)." Noting that the Senate report did not discuss "the interaction of section 853(d) with the section 853(a) requirements," 7 the court
discussed the report's citation to Ulster County Court v. Allen." In Allen
the Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that the rebuttable
presumption contained in section 853(d) violated due process, concluding
that the presumption was constitutional." The Supreme Court "pointed
out that the trial judge instructed the jury not only on the statutory presumption, but also on the customary burden that the government prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0
The court in Elgersma stated that "[o]ne court has noted that the Senate report's cite to Allen indicated a desire to retain the constitutional
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt overall in forfeiture, although the government is entitled to certain presumptions under a lower
standard of proof as part of its case." 71 Again the court stated, however,
62. Id. at 1545 (citing S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3379, 3393).
63. Id, (citing S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3392).
64. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3392).

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).

69. Id. at 163.
70. 929 F.2d at 1545 (citing 442 U.S. at 161-63).
71. Id. (citing United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd, 900 F.2d
748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305 (1990)); but see United States v. HernandezEscarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1577 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 323 7 (1990)
(holding that the Senate report's purpose in citing Allen was to identify permissive presumptions as constitutional, rather than to suggest that the standard of proof under
§ 853(a) was beyond a reasonable doubt).
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that the purpose of citing Allen in the Senate report was unclear, since
the report contained "only a bare citation to the case. 72
The court acknowledged that the three circuits which had confronted
the issue directly had all concluded that a preponderance of the evidence
7
was the proper standard of proof in a section 853 forfeiture proceeding. 3
The court then summarized the arguments on which the other circuits
based their decisions.7
The first argument summarized by the court was that "the statute itself indicates that forfeiture should be treated like criminal sentencing,
rather than an element of the substantive criminal counts. ''7 5 After noting
that "[dlue process allows district courts to make factual determinations
at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence,"'7 6 the court pointed
out the "'in addition to any other sentence'" language found in section
77
853(a) as support for this argument.
The second argument summarized by the court was the declaration by
the Third Circuit in Sandini "that the Senate report indicated that the
civil standard should be applied."'7 8 The court in Elgersma dismissed this
argument by noting that "[tihe support for this particular point is a citation to the page in the Senate report discussing the section 853(d) presumption. '79 The court then restated its view that the report "as a whole
is ambiguous on the applicable burden." 0
The third argument for a preponderance standard is that "the inclusion
of the section 853(d) presumption with its burden of a preponderance is
the only reference to standard of proof in the statute, and the presumption would have no significance if the government were still required to
prove the elements of forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt."'
The fourth argument is that the overall purpose of the statute, to use
forfeiture as a weapon against drug trafficking and organized crime, "is
supported by section 853(o), which states that the 'provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' ,s
72. 929 F.2d at 1545.
73. Id. at 1546.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652 (11th Cir. 1990)). '
77. Id. See Sandini, 816 F.2d at 875; Hernandez-Escarsega,886 F.2d at 1577.
78. 929 F.2d at 1546-47. See 816 F.2d at 869.
79. 929 F.2d at 1546 (citing S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3395).
80. Id. at 1547.
81. Id. (citing 886 F.2d at 1560). The court found this argument "particularly significant
because the RICO criminal forfeiture counterpart does not contain such a presumption." Id.
(citing United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512 (7th Cir. 1989)).
82. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(0) (1988)). See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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The court stated that interpreting section 853(o) to mean that only proof
by a preponderance is required "does not conflict with Garrett because a
defendant in a criminal forfeiture action is still entitled to a jury trial, a
special verdict, and notice of forfeiture in the indictment under Rule 7 [of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure]." ' a The court noted, however,
that Garrett was decided before "Congress amended the statute to make
it easier to bring criminal forfeiture actions."84
The court then addressed the argument that criminal forfeiture under
section 853 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt8 8 The court
pointed out that this argument is "founded on the premise that criminal
forfeiture is a substantive criminal charge to be proved like any other.""
In support of this argument, the court cited two rules of federal criminal
procedure that were enacted prior to enactment of section 853.0 The
first, rule 7(c)(2), requires "that forfeitures be specified in the indictment."88 The second rule, rule 31(e), "requir[es] a special verdict for
forfeiture. "88
The court quoted the Note of the Advisory Committee to rule 31(e),
which states: " '[t]he assumption of the draft is that the amount of interest or property subject to criminal forfeiture is an element of the offense
to be alleged and proved. See Advisory Committee Note to rule
7(c)(2).' ",0 The court then quoted the Advisory Note to rule 7(c)(2),
which states that the legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 indicates a congressional purpose to re-establish a limited common law forfeiture." "Under the common law, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding the defendant was apparently entitled to notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the factual
issues surrounding the declaration of forfeiture.""
The court then reasoned that "[i]f forfeiture is to be charged and
proved as an element of the offense, with accompanying trial procedures,
congressional reference to Rule 31(e) can be seen as incorporating proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." e The court noted that "[t]hose courts that
83.
84.

929 F.2d at 1547.
Id.

85. Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. "Criminal forfeiture. No judgment may be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property
subject to forfeiture." FED. R. CiM. P. 7(c)(2).

89. 929 F.2d at 1547.
90. Id. (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 31(e) advisory committee's note).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3376).
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have upheld the preponderance standard point .out that rule 7 relates to
notice, which is unrelated to the standard of proof."" Also, the court
pointed out that those courts have responded to the rule 31(e) advisory
note by asserting that advisory notes "do not have the force of law. . . or
that the advisory note 'is simply incorrect.'", Although the court stated
that the advisory note to rule 7(c)(2) indicated that criminal forfeiture is
a substantive offense, it conceded that "it is unclear to what extent the
common law forfeiture procedures are to be carried over into the new
statutory version of criminal forfeiture.""
A final argument addressed by the court in favor of a reasonable doubt
standard is that "the statute sought to preserve the government's option
of pursuing criminal and civil forfeiture successively."17 The court noted
that before section 853 was enacted, "the government was allowed to pursue a civil forfeiture action involving the same property as was at issue in
a preceding, unsuccessful criminal forfeiture prosecution because of differing standards of proof.""8 The legislative history of section 853 indicates that successive actions could still be brought after enactment of section 853.9 The court reasoned that "without retaining the differential
burdens of proof, such successive actions would create significant
problems of collateral estoppel, but the Senate report does not focus on
such problems." 10 0
In support of its holding that the applicable standard of proof in a section 853 action is beyond a reasonable doubt, the majority first reasoned
that, "[u]nlike most sentencing, which is determined by a judge, criminal
forfeiture is decided by a jury." 10 1 "Rules 7(c)(2) and 31(e) strongly suggest that some criminal procedures apply to forfeiture, and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is a fundamental element of criminal trials."1'0 The
majority stated that "[t]he legislative history of the statute seems to confirm this view, although obliquely."110 ' In addition, the majority referred
to the Allen cite in the Senate report as indicating that "Congress meant
94. Id. See Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987).
95. 929 F.2d at 1547 (quoting Hernandez-Escarsega,886 F.2d at 1578).
96. Id. at 1547-48.
97. Id. at 1548.
98. Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232
(1972) (holding that government's failure to prove its criminal case beyond a reasonable
doubt did not preclude it from later proving it by a preponderance in a civil action)).
99. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 9, at 3376).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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to incorporate the guarantee of proof beyond a reasonable doubt into the
criminal forfeiture statute." 10 '
Addressing the presumption contained in 853(d) with its preponderance standard, the majority held that it "is merely a part of the ultimate
and separate question of forfeiture under section 853(a),' 0' but that the
requirements of section 853(a) must be proven "whether section 853(d)
applies or not."'" The majority reasoned that
[11f it were otherwise, in those cases in which section 853(d) was applicable the forfeiture requirements of section 853(a) would be useless because property would become forfeitable once the government had satisfied the requirements of section 853(d) that the property was
obtained at
07
the time of the violation and had no other likely source.1
The court reasoned further that "[iimplicit in this reading is the assumption that Congress meant the 'likely source' element of section
853(d) to be distinct from the requirement that property be obtained 'as
the result of such violation' under section 853(a)(1) or be used to facilitate a crime under section 853(a)(2)."''0 The majority concluded its analysis by stating that, despite the language of section 853(j), criminal forfeiture "always has been considered distinct from civil forfeiture."' 0 9
B.

The Concurring Opinion

In his concurring opinion, Judge Anderson disagreed with the majority's holding that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applicable to a
section 853 action, holding instead that the proper standard is a preponderance of the evidence.110 Anderson agreed with the other circuit courts
that criminal forfeiture under section 853 is an element of sentencing
rather than an element of a substantive criminal offense.''
In support of his conclusion, Anderson referred first to the "in imposing sentence on such person" language of section 853(a). 111 Anderson
found most persuasive, however, the presumption contained in 853(d):
"When the government has proved the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence to trigger the presumption, and when the defendant
has adduced no evidence to rebut the presumption, then the property is
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
929 F.2d at 1549. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
929 F.2d at 1549. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
929 F.2d at 1551 (Anderson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

1342

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

forfeited."11 In Anderson's opinion, the majority "errs in assuming that
the higher burden of proof is superimposed on the 853(d) presumption." ' ' In his opinion, the more reasonable assumption is that "Congress
intended to impose the same preponderance standard under section
853(a)." 115
V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

As the majority opinion states, the issue in Elgersma is a close one.126
The direct conflict of the Eleventh Circuit's holding' in Elgersma with
prior decisions by the Third, Seventh, and Ninth circuits is undoubtedly
due to the awkward drafting of section 853, its inconclusive legislative
history, and the lack of United States Supreme Court guidance on the
issue of the applicable burden of proof. As the majority in Elgersma
stated, the court's task in deciding the issue was one of statutory construction, a task that frequently leads to conflicting conclusions by different courts. The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Elgersma, however, surpasses the reasoning in the decision in Sandini (and the other circuit
decisions that adhered to it) in the following respects.
The Eleventh Circuit decision more accurately describes the legislative
history of section 853 as inconclusive on the issue of burden of proof. The
Third Circuit's declaration in Sandini that the legislative history clearly
indicates Congress' intent to apply a civil standard to section 853 is
troublesome, as at least one commentator has noted." 7 Nowhere in the
legislative history is such an intent expressly stated, and when considered
in conjunction with the fact that the statute itself is silent on the issue, it
is doubtful that such a declaration can be characterized as more than a
bald conclusion by the court.
Despite the Third Circuit's overstatement of the legislative history's
clarity, its decision to apply the lower burden of proof is not without support considering Congress' stated purpose for the statute, which is "to
enhance the use of criminal forfeiture as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of the most serious problems facing the country.""' When
considered in conjunction with the reference to "sentencing" in 853(a),
the language of 853(j), 853(o), and the rebuttable presumption of
113. 929 F.2d at 155i.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1552.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
See Tarlow, supra note 20, at 42.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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853(d), 119 the stated purpose of the statute arguably supports the Third
Circuit's decision in Sandini.
The majority opinion in Elgersma, however, provides a more logical interpretation of the seemingly contradictory provisions of section 853 than
does the decision in Sandini and the decisions from other circuits that
followed it. In Sandini, the Third Circuit focused on the preponderance
standard set forth in 853(d), but failed to consider its relationship within
the statute to section 853(a). As the majority in Elgersma points out,
such a reading renders meaningless the requirements of section 853(a),
which require that the property be proven to have been obtained "as a
result of" the criminal violation, not merely that the violation was a
11 0
"likely source" of the property.
Additionally, the majority in Elgersma raised an important issue ignored by the Third Circuit in Sandini. As indicated by the Senate report,
Congress intended that the government have an opportunity to bring a
civil forfeiture proceeding against a defendant following an unsuccessful
criminal forfeiture attempt. If both proceedings are governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard, significant collateral estoppel
problems may arise in the civil forfeiture action."1
The reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Elgersma certainly does not
account for all the interpretative problems with section 853, however. The
majority dismisses the "sentencing" language of 853(a), the "liberal interpretation" language of 853(o), and the "applicability of civil forfeiture"
language of 853(j) without comment, other than to state that it "is for
1 12
Congress to improve on the workability of a statute.
"
However, considering that the rule of lenity' has traditionally been
applied to criminal statutes, that the majority relies on precedent in its
circuit establishing criminal forfeiture as a criminal charge to be proved
like any other (Garrett), and that section 853 is silent on the issue of
overall burden of proof required, the decision in Elgersma withstands
criticism for these omissions.
JAMES

119.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

120, See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
121. 929 F.2d at 1538, 1548.
122.
123.

Id. at 1549. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980).
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